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In cyberspace the First Amendment is a local ordinance.
—John Perry Barlow
In 2002 Tore W. Tvedt, founder of the hate group Vigrid and a Norwegian cit-
izen, was sentenced to time in prison for posting racist and anti-Semitic propa-
ganda on a website. The Anti-Racism Center in Oslo filed a police complaint
against Tvedt. On Vigrid’s website, Tvedt puts forward an ideology that mixes
neo-Nazism, racism, and religion. Tvedt was tried and convicted in the Asker
and Baerum District Court on the outskirts of Oslo. The charges were six counts
of violating Norway’s antiracism law and one count each of a weapons violation
and interfering with police. He was sentenced to seventy-five days in prison,
with forty-five days suspended, and two years’ probation. Activists welcomed
this as the first conviction for racism on the Internet in Norway. Following
Tvedt’s release from prison, his Vigrid website is once again online.1
In contrast to the Norwegian response, many Americans seem to view
white supremacy online as speech obviously protected under the First
Amendment. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) articulated this view following
congressional hearings about hate crime on the Internet in September 1999:
We must be vigilant and prompt in our efforts to begin eliminating hate on the
Internet, but we must also do so with exactitude. From this complicated maze
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of issues, there is simply no simple answer, and with the First Amendment as
our country’s first premise, we know that any solutions that we endorse must
recognize that the surest way to defeat the message of hate is to hold it under
the harsh light of public scrutiny.2
The U.S. Senate’s legislative response to those hearings was to adopt a se-
ries of technical approaches, such as filtering software, to block particular
websites.3
Both the Norwegian and the American responses to online hate are no-
tably from democratic nations theoretically committed to egalitarian ideals.
In Norway, a man is arrested for creating a website filled with racist and anti-
Semitic propaganda, even though the server for that website is located in the
United States; ultimately, the man is released from jail and the website goes
back online. In the United States, citing the protection of hate on the In-
ternet as the country’s “first premise,” senators take a narrowly focused tech-
nolegal view of white supremacy online by attempting to mandate the use of
software filters in public schools and libraries. These examples well illustrate
John Perry Barlow’s point (and this chapter’s epigraph) that in the Informa-
tion Age the First Amendment, which protects free speech, is a “local ordi-
nance”—that is, one specific to the U.S. context. Barlow’s views about In-
ternet regulation, as well as critiques of his views from outside the United
States and oppositional views from U.S.-based critical race theorists, can
shed some light on these disparate democratic responses to white supremacy
online.
John Perry Barlow, retired Wyoming cattle rancher, former lyricist for the
Grateful Dead, and cofounder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is a
widely known critic of Internet regulation. Barlow authored A Declaration of
the Independence of Cyberspace,4 an influential essay written in the polemical
style of a manifesto and declaring the Internet a place that should remain free
from control by “governments of the industrial world,” which he refers to as
“weary giants of flesh and steel.” In that essay Barlow also writes that “we”
(those people online in 1996) would “create a civilization of the mind in cy-
berspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your governments
have made before.” Barlow variously describes himself as an anarchist5 or cy-
berlibertarian6 and believes that government should have no power over the
Internet and that the “only thing that is dangerous is the one that is designed
to stop the free flow of information.” Barlow’s views are acclaimed7 and
shared by most of cyberculture’s leading writers and thinkers8 in the United
States. In fact, it could even reasonably be argued that within the United
States the cyberlibertarian view of the absolute protection of free speech on-
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line is one that is hegemonic—an idea so pervasive as to be taken for granted
as a fundamental, unquestionable truth. In contrast to the cyberlibertarian
view, critical race theorists have argued that interpretations of the First
Amendment that categorize hate speech as protected speech effectively arm
“conscious and unconscious racists—Nazis and liberals alike—with a consti-
tutional right to be racist.”9 My purpose here is to complicate both views in
light of the research presented in the rest of this book about white supremacy
online.
These two opposing views—one focusing on the Internet, the other on
race—reflect the point I made earlier (chapter 2) that most theories about
race do not take the Internet into account and most theories about the In-
ternet do not take race into account. However, I can now add one small ex-
ception to that overarching observation: when it comes to hate speech on-
line a number of critical race theorists have begun to explore the
implications of this theoretical perspective for the Information Age,10 and
some cyberculture writers have thoughtfully considered hate speech in digi-
tal media. The discussion here is intended to contribute to this emerging lit-
erature by using a comparative, transnational perspective to understand the
global response to white supremacy online.
In this comparative analysis I first take up a number of illustrative exam-
ples of responses to white supremacy online outside the United States and
then contrast them with analogous responses inside the United States, re-
turning to two cases discussed earlier in the book (e.g., Machado and
Jouhari). The United States’ response to white supremacy online is markedly
different from that of other democratic nations and has been referred to as
the cyberhate divide. I explore the significance of this divide by examining the
case of France v. Yahoo! Inc., the California-based international Internet
company. While others have focused on the case’s implication for American
notions of free speech, what it reveals about transnational responses to white
supremacy online is equally interesting.
I then shift from this comparative analysis using selected case studies and
offer a more theoretical analysis. I locate the different responses between the
United States and other democratic nations within the conceptually oppos-
ing views of cyberlibertarians and critical race theorists. In the last section, I
analyze the connection between online extremist white supremacy and
mainstream white supremacy through the lens of interpretation and imple-
mentation of the First Amendment and the Patriot Act in the United States.
I place this comparison within the theoretical tradition of critical theory,
drawing on Marcuse’s notion of repressive tolerance to clarify the links.
Namely, the American absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment,
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which views of white supremacy online as protected speech, is an interpreta-
tion born out of a white racial frame, rooted in colonialism, and stands at
odds with the wider democratic global community.
Responses to White Supremacy Online 
in Transnational Perspective
Efforts to combat white supremacy online extend across national bound-
aries.11 In fact, according to one scholarly assessment there has been a “nearly
unanimous international institution of regulations restricting online hate
speech.”12 While in the earliest days of the Internet many people imagined 
a borderless world in which the regulation of nation-states no longer mat-
tered,13 now that expectation is beginning to fade away.14 Instead of a truly
global network, the Internet is increasingly a collection of nation-state 
networks—networks still linked by the Internet protocol, but for many pur-
poses separate.15 Today national governments around the world can and do
make laws that govern the content posted on the Internet (or sent via e-
mail). Australia, Canada, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Norway, and Sweden are among the long list of nation-states that have taken
such action.16
Governments in democratic societies are supposed to be responsive to
their citizens, and this responsiveness should extend to considering white su-
premacy online. In the Norwegian case described at the beginning of this
chapter, a citizen-led nongovernmental organization (NGO) prompted the
government to take action against Tore W. Tvedt’s online white supremacy.
The Anti-Racism Center in Oslo filed a complaint against Tvedt, citing his
racist website, and since the Norwegian government had an existing an-
tiracism law on the books that extended to white supremacy online, they
honored their law and responded swiftly.
Individual citizens acting apart from any institutional or governmental af-
filiation can elicit government response. For example, Canadian citizen
Richard Warman has, over the past six years or so, lodged fifteen different
complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission against white su-
premacists who use the Internet to persecute Jews, blacks, and gays and les-
bians, among others.17 As with the Norwegian NGO, Warman’s complaints
find traction in Canada, where antiracism laws, including prohibitions
against white supremacy online, are already enacted. Such individual actions
by citizens like Warman do not occur in a vacuum; they take place within
specific national contexts with particular cultural and social histories, and of
course, these contexts vary tremendously.
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In Germany freedom of speech is a central tenet of their view of democ-
racy, and their interpretation of this right includes bans on certain forms of
white supremacy online. For example, the German ban on Nazi emblems,
like the swastika, extends to the prohibition of the sale of such items on the
Internet. To enforce this law, in March 2008 police in eight German states
raided the homes of twenty-three suspects as part of a lengthy probe into the
illegal sale of right-wing extremist literature and audio material. Another
seventy suspects were identified in the investigation, which had begun in
August of 2006 after the German unit of the U.S. online-auction company
eBay Inc. reported the online sale of far-right material. Among the items
seized were twenty-four computers, some fifty memory devices, and approxi-
mately 3,500 right-wing extremist CDs and LPs. According to a spokesper-
son for the Federal Crime Office (BKA), the raids were part of the ongoing
“fight against right-wing extremism on the Internet. These raids demonstrate
that the Internet is not a law-free zone.”18 (Adjudication of this case is still
pending as of this writing.) The Germany Constitutional Framework, em-
bodied in the Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, became the foundation for the Ger-
man constitutional system in the aftermath of World War II. Drafters of the
Basic Law were careful to include broad guarantees of freedom of expression
in order to prevent any recurrence of Nazi-style totalitarianism, with the Ba-
sic Law specifically noting that “there shall be no censorship.”19 The
Grundgesetz conditions all rights and guarantees to free speech on preserva-
tion of the right to “human dignity,” that constitution’s most highly prized
value. It is within this framework that German legislators have established
severe penalties for hate speech on the Internet. Even before the emergence
of the Internet, German law prohibited speech that incited racial hatred,20 so
with the dawn of the Information Age, lawmakers extended the prohibitions
to the Internet. Germany was the first among Western democratic nations to
regulate white supremacy online with the 1995 passage of its Information
and Communications Services Act (ICSA). The ICSA holds ISPs liable for
knowingly making illegal content available, has established a cybersheriff
who monitors the Internet for objectionable content, and makes it a crime
to disseminate or make accessible materials deemed harmful to children.21 In
1998 the general manager of California-based CompuServe Germany, Felix
Somm, was prosecuted and convicted under the ICSA as an accessory to the
dissemination of Hitler images and Nazi symbols. Somm’s conviction was
overturned in 1999, but the case sent a powerful message to all ISPs that they
can and will be held liable in Germany for the content on their servers.22
Although the outcome of this one case remains unknown, it reflects a 
wider pattern of response from the German government. In 2002 the 
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German government adopted a broad strategy to combat right-wing extrem-
ism. The “four pillars,” as they are called, aim to educate all citizens of their
human rights, strengthen civil society and promote civil courage, help inte-
grate foreign nationals into society, and target suspected far-right extrem-
ists.23 This approach acknowledges that it is important and possible to strike
a balance between safeguarding human dignity and protecting freedom of ex-
pression in a democratic civil society. Germany embraces democratic ideals
while seriously addressing the racist, anti-Semitic propaganda that threatens
them. Other Western industrialized democratic nations take similar ap-
proaches, broadening the scope of their existing antiracism laws to address
online racism.
In 2001 the Council of Europe (COE)’s Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights submitted a report titled “Racism and Xenophobia in Cyber-
space.”24 The COE (comprised of forty-seven nations) was founded in 1949
with the ideals of the European Convention on Human Rights as its basis.
The report recommended the COE adopt a protocol that would define and
criminalize the “dissemination of racist propaganda and abusive storage of
hateful message(s).” In 2003 the COE passed the Additional Protocol to the
Convention on Cybercrime, an agreement between member states “to ensure
a proper balance between freedom of expression and effective fight against
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature.”25 There is disagreement among Eu-
ropean nations as to how and when white supremacy online should be ad-
dressed at a governmental level (e.g., a Nazi symbol is illegal in Germany but
not in Denmark). Still, transnational agreements between European Union
(EU)26 member nations address expressions of white supremacy and racism.
In a 2007 vote EU ministers passed a broad antiracism law applying mainly
to racist expressions offline. It took six long years to finalize the wording of
the motion, and in the end some NGOs, like the European Network Against
Racism, complained that the language was too weak.27 The transnational di-
alogue is not perfect, but it is vital, and the cross-border work of such NGOs
is critical to moving the discussion forward.
The Amsterdam-based International Network Against Cyberhate 
(INACH) is an NGO that organizes transnational efforts to fight online
white supremacy (www.inach.net). Established in 2002 as a foundation un-
der Dutch law, INACH’s original mission was to connect online complaint
bureaus in a number of different nation-states that were actively monitoring
white supremacy online. INACH has since evolved to include a cross-
national network with fourteen participating states called by one leading ac-
tivist a “model for international cooperation in the fight against cyber-
hate.”28 Since 2005 INACH has been administered by American Chris Wolf,
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known as a leader in the practice of Internet law and as chair of the ADL’s
Internet Task Force. Each year INACH convenes an international confer-
ence of legal, academic, nongovernmental, and antiracism activist-leaders to
address the issue of white supremacy online. Throughout the year, INACH
connects the network nodes—or members—who actively monitor white su-
premacy online from Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Latvia,
Moldova, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and the United States (represented by the ADL). Within
this coalition of nation-states, the United States represents something of an
anomaly. While other democratic nations enshrine free speech as a funda-
mental right for each of their citizens, they have found ways to simultane-
ously preserve their citizens’ right to human dignity.29 The American view is
quite different.
Responses to White Supremacy Online 
within the United States
In 1999 Richard Machado was the first person to be convicted of using the
Internet to commit a hate crime (discussed in chapter 3). Unlike Tvedt, the
man in the Norwegian case, Machado did not publish a white supremacist
website but rather sent threatening e-mails. White supremacy online forfeits
its First Amendment protection in the United States only when it is joined
with conduct that threatens, harasses, or incites illegality.30 Yet even when
this narrow prosecutorial standard is legitimately met, the law fails to be con-
sistently applied.
Uneven prosecution of hate speech is rooted in racial inequality. The only
individual prosecuted to date for white supremacy online is a Mexican Amer-
ican, which is disturbingly consistent with racial trends in the rest of the U.S.
criminal justice system. There minority men are suspected, arrested, prose-
cuted, and incarcerated differently than are whites. In the lone conviction
for Internet hate speech the victims were Asian and Asian American, who,
because they are often stereotyped as model minorities, might be less likely to
interpret and then condemn their harassment as part of systemic discrimina-
tion. The victims’ lack of public recrimination only made it easier for those
outside the case to ignore any connection it had to white supremacy.
When Bonnie Jouhari reported that she and her daughter were being tar-
geted by Roy E. Frankhouser’s online threats, local authorities in Reading,
Pennsylvania, neglected to enforce the law, believing that to do so violated
Frankhouser’s right to free speech. Jouhari’s biracial daughter and work at
HUD assisting minorities made their household a target for white supremacist
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harassment, and her gender situated her as a comparatively powerless member
of society, thus rendering her initial attempts to get protection from the legal
system ineffectual because her complaints were given less legitimacy. Inter-
pretation of the First Amendment and what speech it protects is often in the
hands of local law-enforcement officials, and so Jouhari was powerless when
they refused to assist her. Eventually Frankhouser was prosecuted only after
additional legislation was passed by Jouhari’s employer, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which moved to create new legis-
lation to protect employees from racially-motivated harassment.
And though William A. White posted to his website threatening messages
along with the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the African
American youth involved in the Jena 6 case, as of this writing he has not
been prosecuted. Why White remains free is troubling, as he is well known
to local and federal law-enforcement officials.31
The prosecution of white supremacy online32 seems to rely on racialized
notions of whose speech is protected (white supremacists Frankhouser and
White) and whose is not (Mexican American Machado). Sadly, rather than
prosecuting online white supremacy, the United States prefers to hide behind
a technolegal stance and advocate filtering software.
Technolegal Responses
In fall of 1999 the U.S. Congress held hearings on hate crime on the Internet
(mentioned in the opening of this chapter). Following the hearings, legislators
decided that mandating Internet-filtering software was the best way to deal with
white supremacy online. Filtering software uses key themes or words (e.g., racial
epithets) to block some websites from appearing in searches. With filtering soft-
ware installed, a search-engine query for information that is on the blocked list
will trigger a pop-up window to appear that informs the user that the site they
are searching for is prohibited; none of the text or images from that site load into
the user’s browser. In 1999 Congress attempted to require public libraries to use
filtering software capable of screening out white supremacist (and porno-
graphic) sites on computers used by children. The proposed legislation would
also have required Internet service providers (ISPs) to offer the necessary soft-
ware to their customers free or at cost. The legislation also made teaching and
demonstrating how to make explosives a crime. This bill failed to pass into law,
largely opposed due to concerns about the First Amendment and protection of
free speech. While national efforts have been unsuccessful, one state, Arizona,
passed a law in 1999 that mandates public schools and libraries use filtering soft-
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ware. In practice, even without that legislative requirement, most public li-
braries and schools in the United States frequented by children do use filtering
software. Since 1999 the issue of white supremacy online has failed to receive
national legislative attention,33 an approach both deeply flawed and character-
istically American.
For a number of reasons filtering software is grossly inadequate to addressing
white supremacy online. First, it offers a technological solution to what is an
inherently social problem, and such solutions are doomed to failure. Also, the
software typically blocks only certain predetermined words and themes, which
the deceptive cloaked sites will have no trouble sidestepping. Furthermore, fil-
ters frequently block sites not intended for censorship. For instance, a block
programmed to exclude any sex-related sites will include terms that also appear
on legitimate sites, filtering out any websites about breast cancer or other med-
ical concerns in addition to pornographic sites. In a related issue, the filtering
software infringes on the First Amendment rights of children. Chris Hansen, a
senior lawyer with the ACLU who specializes in Internet matters, argues that
children have the right to obtain material, such as sexual- and reproductive-
health information—even if some adults find the information offensive. In ad-
dition, children who may be wondering about their own gender or sexual iden-
tity are usually blocked from exploring LGBTQ sites because gay civil rights
organizations are included under the filtering umbrella of pornography.34
In the early days of the Internet, when Congress first held the hearings
on hate crime and the Internet, anything associated with the online world
elicited an air of panicked moralizing; managing online white supremacy
with filtering software was a quintessentially American response. The deci-
sion was premised on an unwavering faith in American ingenuity to con-
quer all obstacles, completely ignored race as central to the problem, and in-
cluded a market-based approach that relied on software companies to
produce and sell filtering programs as the centerpiece in combating white
supremacy online. If the proposed legislation had passed, it would have re-
quired all public schools and libraries to install filtering software. The one or
few private companies who won those contracts would have enjoyed an eco-
nomic windfall, yet white supremacist content online would have continued
to proliferate, unchecked. And so passing legislation to mandate filtering
software would have profited the few, confirmed the American can-do
mythology, and entirely ignored white supremacy’s racial component. On-
line white supremacy can be addressed, but not through a solution that re-
lies exclusively on market-based strategies and benefits an elite few while
discounting a racial analysis.
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Market-Economy Responses
The American approach to handling white supremacy online has routinely
featured market-economy responses from leading companies in the Internet
industry, most notably AOL (America Online) and Google. AOL, the In-
ternet division of Time Warner, has emerged as the world’s largest Internet
service provider (ISP), with some 21.7 million subscribers in the United
States and Europe as of 2005.35 Unlike other ISPs, AOL’s original business
model was known as a walled-garden model—that is, they offered a propri-
etary network of content, online shopping, and other services to AOL paid
subscribers only. This changed in June 2005 when AOL began offering free
access to certain features and content. Even after this shift, AOL continues
to advertise itself as a safe Internet environment. Jonathan Miller, the com-
pany’s CEO, was asked in an interview whether or not there was still reason
to subscribe. He said, “Yes, because AOL in part—in particular for kids—is
very much tied up in providing a safe environment.”36 AOL has fairly ag-
gressively marketed itself as a safe online space because of its vigilance
against pornography, though they have paid comparatively little attention to
racism online. The Rules of the Road, or Terms of Service (TOS) agreement,
used by AOL prohibits attacks based on personal characteristics like race, na-
tional origin, ethnicity, or religion. Yet AOL provided hosting for the web-
site of a KKK group, The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan–Realm of Texas, and
did not regard the site as violating its terms of service. It was in this context
that the Anti-Defamation League (the ADL) challenged AOL to adhere to
its own TOS agreement, which states that AOL has the right to “remove
content they deem harmful or offensive,” and remove the Klan website.37
AOL declined, arguing that even the KKK’s racism is protected under the
First Amendment, and pointed out that the AOL search engine does block
the use of some terms. AOL prohibits the search of terms like nigger, kike, slut,
and whore in their Member’s Directory and its site. Nor can member profiles
include such words.38 While AOL has been criticized by activist groups like
the ADL for its inconsistent enforcement of its own TOS agreement, white
supremacists like David Duke see such enforcement as infringing on their
constitutional right to free speech. Duke posted the following to his personal
website in 2002:
The ADL works to ensure that commercial ISPs create terms of service that
limit what their users can read or say. By lobbying commercial carriers to
censor their users, the ADL achieves [sic] their aim of outlawing free speech
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and expression without the contraints [sic] of the First Amendment’s pro-
tections.39
Here Duke sounds like any other American concerned about encroach-
ment on his civil liberties. Duke’s rhetoric, when separated from the anti-
Semitism in the rest of his post, fits seamlessly with that of others who would
argue that the First Amendment is intended to protect his speech. Non-
governmental organizations like the ADL can bring political pressure to bear
on Internet-industry companies, like AOL, to get them to enforce their own
TOS agreements. But when the First Amendment is popularly seen to pro-
tect white supremacy online, Internet companies are put in a difficult posi-
tion. From the perspective of AOL, they are caught between upholding a
constitutional right and removing content that is clearly offensive and in vi-
olation of their TOS agreement.
Google, the search engine company whose motto is “Don’t be evil,” has
had its own encounters with white supremacy online. In 2004 Steven Wein-
stock (described in press accounts as “a real estate investor and former
yeshiva student”) did a Google search using the term Jew and was shocked to
find that Frank Weltner’s anti-Semitic website JewWatch.com appeared first
in the Google search results. Weltner, you will recall, is the white suprema-
cist who also published the cloaked sites soliciting donations for victims of
Hurricane Katrina and maintains the cloaked American Civil Rights Review
site (discussed in chapter 7). Weinstock began an online petition in an effort
to get Weltner’s site removed from the Google index that produces search 
results. He hoped that if he could amass fifty thousand requests to remove 
the site, Google would comply. Although his petition fell far short of this
goal (he got about 2,800 signatures), it would not have mattered. According
to Google spokesperson David Krane, the company “can’t and won’t change”
the ranking for Jew Watch, regardless of how many signatures the petition at-
tracts. Krane went on to say that “Google’s search results are solely deter-
mined by computer algorithms that essentially reflect the popular opinion of
the Web. Our search results are not manipulated by hand. We’re not able to
make any manual changes to the results.”40
This is both true and not true. Google receives about thirty requests per
month to remove specific pages from its search results, usually because of al-
leged copyright or trademark infringement, and Google complies with most
of these requests, even though many of those pages are located on servers
outside the United States.41 When Google issued the statement through
Krane, it was true that Google was not in the habit of altering the results of
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their algorithm based on political content, but by 2006 Google had followed
chief competitor Yahoo! Inc. into China. In order to receive permission from
the Chinese government to gain access to its enormous market, Google
would first have to restrict the results of their algorithm to block any sites
about human rights, democracy, Tibet, Taiwan, and the Tiananmen Square
uprising. At the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, Google CEO Eric
Schmidt explained the decision-making process this way: “We concluded
that, although we weren’t wild about the restrictions, it was even worse to
not try to server those users at all. We actually did an evil scale.”42 Google
executives said that its approach in China would be to notify users when re-
sults had been blocked by the government.
Google applied a similar strategy to search results for Jew. Weltner’s Jew
Watch site is still first in Google’s search-engine results, but in response to
protests by Weinstock and intervention by the ADL,43 above the result for
Jew Watch is a message from Google warning of “offensive search results”
(google.com/explanation), with small text on that page that reads “We’re
disturbed by these results as well,” followed by an invitation to “Please read
our note here.” For those who follow the link, Google offers a lengthy expla-
nation with this central argument:
A site’s ranking in Google’s search results relies heavily on computer algo-
rithms using thousands of factors to calculate a page’s relevance to a given
query. Sometimes subtleties of language cause anomalies to appear that cannot
be predicted. A search for Jew brings up one such unexpected result.44
The “subtleties of language” that Google attributes causality to here are
the distinction between Jew and Jewish in common usage. Google’s explana-
tion page points out the social and political context of the usage of these two
words in which the former is “often used in an anti-Semitic context” and the
latter is more likely used by members of the community talking about their
faith. This acknowledgment of the anti-Semitic context marks a curious and
impartial departure from the usual business of search engines in which infor-
mation is presumed to be free of social and political context. It is curious, be-
cause there is no similar disclaimer above the search-engine results for a
search for other common racial (or sexual) epithets, such as a common racial
epithet for African Americans. And it is impartial because, along with
Google’s disclaimer about anti-Semitism, the Google algorithm also returns
related searches, including Jew jokes.
The responses to white supremacy online from Internet-industry giants
AOL and Google may seem contradictory at first. AOL wants to provide a
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safe environment yet allows KKK websites. Google claims the company op-
erates according to its motto “Don’t be evil” though Jew Watch remains at
the top of the search returns and the company blocks prodemocracy websites
for users in China. These responses are not all contradictory when viewed
through the lens of a cyberlibertarian interpretation of the First Amendment
and neoliberal capitalism. The cyberlibertarian ethos that information exists
apart from social and political context (e.g., information wants to be free) al-
lows white supremacy online to continue unchecked and is beneficial to the
Internet industry as a whole.45 For Internet companies operating within the
framework of a cyberlibertarian ethos and neoliberal capitalism, matters of
race are always viewed as irrelevant unless and until they are seen to be in-
terfering with the smooth operation of the market system. Of course, the sup-
posedly free-market approach of neoliberal capitalism relies heavily on na-
tion-states to operate. Nation-states, by maintaining the rule of law, provide
the infrastructure necessary for companies like AOL and Google to operate.
AOL and Google could not exist in the anarchy that prevailed in Russia in
the 1990s or in the failed states of Africa, where the lack of basic public
goods would make thriving Internet businesses impossible.46 As long as the
status quo of white supremacy online does not threaten the profits for those
in charge of large corporations and their shareholders, racism will continue
to be regarded as irrelevant.
If someone posted online their clear intention to violate the prohibition
against discrimination in housing, guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of
1964, then surely that would constitute a form of white supremacy online 
that the courts would address. Or so thought some activist lawyers in
Chicago. It was this logic that prompted the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law to file suit against the online classified advertis-
ing site Craigslist.org, arguing it violated the Fair Housing Act when real es-
tate ads displayed racially discriminatory statements like “no minorities.” A
judge in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Craigslist.org was
not responsible for the listings, as they were simply a messenger and should
not be liable for the content of the ad. Furthermore, the judge in this case
ruled that monitoring the ads for discriminatory language was “impractical,”
due to the “complexity of the task.” And, indeed, the model developed by
Craigslist founder Craig Newmark relies on an extremely small staff of peo-
ple to run the site (fewer than twenty people), while users throughout the
world do the bulk of the work of posting and responding to ads. Any user on
any Craigslist can flag a post as inappropriate, but this is a far cry from the
site itself eliminating racist ads in clear violation of the Fair Housing Act. In
effect, the judge in this case ruled in favor of the market economy, giving
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Craigslist a free pass because to do otherwise would be “impractical” and
“complex.”47 Given the expansion of white supremacy online, the simulta-
neous unwillingness of U.S. courts to address it, and the ineffectiveness of
technolegal and market-economy responses, the task of responding to white
supremacy online in the United States is left principally to three NGOs and
the rare individual.
NGOs in the United States Fighting White Supremacy Online
The effort to combat white supremacy online in the United States is led by
three nongovernmental organizations: the Anti-Defamation League (ADL),
the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center
(SPLC). The ADL (adl.org) is the oldest of these, founded in 1913 to “stop,
by appeals to reason and conscience and, if necessary, by appeals to law, the
defamation of the Jewish people.” Their mission includes monitoring and
taking action against white supremacy online. Currently led by Abraham
Foxman and headquartered in New York City (with twenty-nine offices
across the United States), the ADL has an annual budget of over $50 mil-
lion.48 Brian Marcus, a scholar and activist, serves as director of the ADL’s In-
ternet Monitoring Unit, comprised of a team of investigative researchers and
analysts who, since 1985, have gathered information about white supremacy
online from their New York offices. Over the last twenty years the ADL has
expanded their Internet monitoring to include the monitoring of extremists
of all types, including Islamic terrorists. The ADL shares the information col-
lected with law enforcement via a number of mechanisms, including pub-
lished reports, e-mail newsletters, and professional trainings. A valuable
source for law enforcement is the ADL Law Enforcement Agency Resource
Network (adl.org/LEARN), an online resource that receives over a million
visitors per year. The ADL is also the only NGO in the United States that is
part of the International Network Against Cyberhate (inach.net).
A major resource in the effort to combat white supremacy online and off-
line is the Simon Wiesenthal Center (wiesenthal.com). The Wiesenthal
Center is an international Jewish human-rights organization with a major
presence in the United States, primarily in Los Angeles and New York, and
an operating budget of just over $35 million. The center includes a values-
based educational effort aimed at confronting anti-Semitism, racism, and
hate; teaching the lessons of the Holocaust for future generations; and con-
fronting Islamic terrorism, a relatively new emphasis. The center’s educa-
tional efforts are administered primarily through the Museum of Tolerance in
Los Angeles and the New York Tolerance Center. Digital Terrorism and Hate,
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the annual interactive report (CD-ROM) produced by the center, analyzes
over six thousand problematic website portals, terrorist manuals, blogs, chat
rooms, videos, and hate games on the Internet that promote racial violence,
anti-Semitism, homophobia, hate music, and terrorism. The report is based
on data collected by a team of researchers led by scholar-activist Mark Weitz-
man, the director of Task Force Against Hate and Terrorism (Weitzman also
serves as director of the New York Tolerance Center), and Rabbi Abraham
Cooper, associate dean of the center. Translated into multiple languages, the
report is distributed to government agencies, community activists, educators,
and members of the media as part of the center’s broader educational efforts
to teach tolerance.
The Southern Poverty Law Center (splcenter.org) based in Montgomery,
Alabama, has an annual operating budget of around $37 million and an 
endowment of approximately $200 million. When founded in 1971, the
SPLC was originally the small civil rights law firm of Morris Dees and Joe
Levin, two lawyers committed to fighting for racial equality through the
courts. Since 1981 the SPLC has been monitoring extremist white suprema-
cist activity throughout the United States. Additionally, the SPLC has de-
veloped a K–12 curriculum for teaching tolerance and respect in U.S.
schools. Dees and Levin pioneered the legal strategy of filing civil suits
against white supremacists for activities offline that escaped the reach of
criminal prosecution. One of the SPLC’s notable lawsuits was in response to
the murder by skinheads of an Ethiopian immigrant in Portland, Oregon.
The skinheads who beat this man to death were acolytes of White Aryan Re-
sistance leader Tom Metzger. In October 1990 attorneys for the SPLC won a
civil case on behalf of murdered hate-crime victim Mulugeta Seraw’s family
against Tom Metzger and his son John Metzger for a total of $12.5 million.49
The SPLC, through the efforts of Mark Potok, who heads the Intelligence
Project, is also actively engaged in monitoring white supremacy online, and
they keep an extensive archive of websites, blogs, and chat rooms associated
with extremist groups based in the United States.
It is worth briefly mapping out the conceptual differences between these
three premier organizations. The ADL is a Jewish organization with a pri-
mary focus on anti-Semitism online as well as racism. As the Internet Mon-
itoring division has expanded their work, they have broadened their scope to
include all types of political extremism, such as Islamic extremists. Similarly,
the Simon Wiesenthal Center is primarily focused on anti-Semitism and
casts a wide net when collecting the six thousand “problematic” Web sources
for their Digital Hate and Terrorism report, which includes white supremacists
as well as Islamic terrorists. Of the three organizations, the SPLC is the most
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narrowly focused on white supremacist groups in the United States. While
the SPLC does not actively monitor Islamic extremists, it does include black
separatist groups in its tracking data. There is, as far as I can tell,50 some co-
operation between the three organizations but very little, if any, strategically
coordinated efforts at addressing white supremacy online. In part, this has to
do with the different missions that overlap significantly but not completely
or seamlessly. In part, the lack of strategic coordination has to do with the
unique histories and constituencies of each organization. These divergent
backgrounds mean that, for each organization, there is a slightly different
definition of the problem that overlaps or diverges from the organizations’
missions in various ways. In an ironic turn, the widening focus of the ADL
and the Simon Wiesenthal Center to include Islamic extremists converges
with the U.S. government’s interest in fighting terrorism in the post-9/11 era.
Similarly, the SPLC’s widening scope to include black separatist groups con-
verges with the long history of the U.S. government’s interest in monitoring
domestic black-nationalist groups. While Islamic extremists are certainly a
source of violent anti-Semitism, it is difficult to see how black-nationalist
groups pose a serious threat to a democratic society within the context of
decades of targeted violence and harassment by the U.S. government itself.
My point here in mapping out these areas of similarities and differences in
strategies between and among these organizations is to illustrate how the 
understanding shifts depending on the lens: if the lens is extremists world-
wide, with an emphasis on anti-Semitism, then Islamic extremists are in-
cluded with white supremacists. If the lens is extremists solely in the United
States with a focus on race, then black separatists are included. When
mapped in this way, the efforts the ADL, Simon Wiesenthal Center, and
SPLC set in sharp relief a broader failure within American society as a whole
to address embedded white supremacy in a meaningful way within its cultural
and social institutions.
Individual Efforts within the United States
Some have argued that the most appropriate response to white supremacy
online is for individual computer users to infiltrate white supremacist web-
sites to try and change the discursive subculture.51 Others have hacked hate
websites to disrupt their Internet service.52 Perhaps the most significant re-
sponse from an individual activist in the United States to white supremacy
online was that of David Goldman. Goldman, a Harvard Law School librar-
ian, created a website in 1995 called Hatewatch, the first site to track white
supremacy online. Goldman’s Hatewatch attracted incredible media cover-
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age and Web traffic, at one point attracting one million visitors a year.53 It
also attracted controversy. In 2000 film critic Roger Ebert launched a
scathing public attack on Goldman at the Conference on World Affairs for
linking to hate sites. Ebert argued that Hatewatch gave free publicity to
haters, providing a “virtual supermarket” for those interested in finding white
supremacy online. Ebert also criticized Goldman for his failure to offer any
critical analysis of the racist propaganda at these sites (unlike the ADL and
Simon Wiesenthal Center that point out the lies and distortions).54 A year
later, in 2001, Goldman stopped maintaining the site.55 He said it was not
because of the criticisms he had received but because he felt that the site had
done its job. “We have succeeded in fulfilling the mission we set for our-
selves,” he wrote in a farewell message posted on the site. Goldman was 
bolstered by news that “hate sites simply weren’t proving to be such power-
ful recruitment tools as many had feared.”56 Goldman’s assessment is inter-
esting in light of the earlier discussion about social-movement recruitment
and the Internet. His view coincides with my own analysis that brochure
sites with static displays of information are not effective mechanisms for 
social-movement recruitment. However, Goldman disbanded Hatewatch in
2001 just prior to the phenomenal increase in participation at Stormfront.
Still, no one can blame Goldman for wanting to stop monitoring white su-
premacist websites after six years; it is difficult, sometimes courageous, and
often thankless work. Individual approaches such as Goldman’s brave (if per-
haps a bit misguided) actions ultimately offer limited effectiveness on a broad
scale (and tend to be site-specific and small scale).
Valuing Free Speech Differently
Free speech is among the most highly valued ideals in mainstream American
culture. This ideal is tied to Enlightenment philosophical traditions of rea-
son and tolerance. Yet this supposedly shared American value of free speech
seems less than ideal when viewed by those who are targets of hate speech.
For example, a 2005 Knight Foundation study of U.S. high school-aged stu-
dents found that African American students (43 percent) and Hispanic stu-
dents (41 percent) were more likely than white students (31 percent) to
think the First Amendment “goes too far” in the rights it guarantees.57 Such
findings from public-opinion polling suggest that at an early age young
African American and Hispanic people realize that the ideal of free speech
does not apply to them equally; thus they evaluate the First Amendment less
favorably than white youths. The findings also suggest an epistemology that
begins with an understanding of racial inequality and an ethic of caring
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(about the victims of hate speech) at the center of analysis. When divorced
from this analysis of racial inequality and ethic of caring, however, it is clear
that in the United States white supremacy online benefits from near absolute
First Amendment protection.58
The Cyberhate Divide: How the U.S. Response Affects 
Global Response to White Supremacy Online
Given the nearly unanimous international adoption of regulations restricting
online hate speech, the United States stands alone in its support of free
speech—including white supremacy online.59 One scholar has called these
divergent approaches to white supremacy online the U.S./Europe cyberhate
divide.60 Global efforts to combat white supremacy online are seriously un-
dermined by the U.S. position in a number of ways.
The cyberhate divide also means that the United States becomes the lo-
cation of choice for white supremacists worldwide who wish to post their
hate speech online without fear of prosecution. This practice is what another
scholar has referred to as “importing” hate.61 It is possible to prosecute some-
one within one national jurisdiction for material on the Web that is hosted
on a server in the United States, and this is what happened in the Norwe-
gian case. Tvedt’s Vigrid website was hosted on a U.S. server, yet he was 
successfully prosecuted. Even so, because U.S.-based servers allow for such
content, fighting white supremacy becomes an international game of whack-
a-mole: hate material is quashed in one jurisdiction only to pop up in an-
other. And this is exactly what happened in Tvedt’s case: after serving one
year in prison and denied a Web presence for one year, Tvedt was released
from jail and put his site back online.
In addition, the United States exports white supremacy via the Internet.
The majority of white supremacist sites online are created by Americans and
hosted in the United States. Given the global nature of the Web, these sites
made in the United States are, then, available anywhere in the world, even
in countries where the material is illegal.
An important example of the very literal way that U.S.-based under-
standings of First Amendment protections for white supremacy online get
exported around the world is the France v. Yahoo! Inc. case.62 In 2000 two
French NGOs, the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism
(LICRA) and the Union of Jewish Students, filed a complaint in the French
courts against Yahoo! Inc., the Cupertino, California–based Internet com-
pany. LICRA and the Union of Jewish Students charged that Yahoo’s auc-
tion sites, available through the company’s French-based affiliate Yahoo.fr,
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allowed Nazi memorabilia to be sold in France where such materials are ille-
gal. The French courts ruled in May 2000 that Yahoo! Inc. was in violation
of French law and must therefore “make it impossible” for Internet users in
France to access any Yahoo! websites that auction anti-Semitic material.
CEO Jerry Yang refused to comply with the judge’s decision, saying, “We are
not going to change the content of our sites in the United States just because
someone in France is asking us to do so.”63 When Yang failed to comply, the
French courts began levying fines against Yahoo! Inc., costing the company
estimated millions.
What followed was a years-long legal battle between France and Yahoo!
Inc. fought in both French and U.S. courts that hinged in a very central way
on the ability of individual nation-states to control white supremacy online
in a global context. On the one side were the antiracism activists who argued
that French laws applied to Internet content. One lawyer representing the
French groups said, “There is this naïve idea that the Internet changes every-
thing. It doesn’t change everything. It doesn’t change the laws in France.”64
On the other side were leading figures in the United States who adopted a
cyberlibertarian approach, such as MIT’s Nicholas Negroponte, who said,
“It’s not that the laws aren’t relevant; it’s that the nation-state’s not relevant.
The Internet cannot be regulated.”65 This “impossibility” argument was the
main tenet of Yahoo! Inc.’s defense; they argued that to limit what Internet
content users in one geographic location (e.g., France) could access on the
Internet was an impossible technological request.66 Yet this claim was at odds
with the shifting technological and political reality of the Internet. A key
turning point in the case was evidence introduced about new technology, re-
ferred to as geo-ID, that could identify and screen Internet content on the
basis of geographical source.
In 2001 Yahoo! Inc. seemed to change course and embrace the geo-ID and
governmental control of the Internet. Early in that year the company issued
a statement that it would stop selling Nazi memorabilia on sites available in
France, citing bad publicity rather than the judge’s ruling. Later in 2001 Ya-
hoo! Inc. contracted with a geo-ID firm to target advertising to Web visitors
in geographically specific locations. Then in the summer of 2002 they signed
an agreement with China called the Public Pledge on Self-discipline for 
the Chinese Internet Industry. By signing this pledge Yahoo! Inc. won a lu-
crative contract to provide Internet services for China with the condition
that it would block any content the Chinese government deemed objection-
able, such as prodemocracy websites. Despite this seeming shift toward em-
bracing the possibility of government control of the Internet, in 2005 Yahoo!
Inc. filed a countersuit in California against the French government for the
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decision in the Nazi memorabilia case, and the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals said it would rehear some arguments in the case.67 As of this writing,
there has been no decision in this case, but the lengthy court battle and 
Yahoo! Inc.’s conflicting stance on whether and when to cooperate with na-
tion-states who want to control Internet content is telling. In the French
case, Yahoo! Inc. resisted the French government’s efforts to protect its 
citizens from Nazi memorabilia; in the Chinese case, Yahoo! Inc. was com-
plicit in the antidemocratic wishes of the Chinese government to prevent its
citizens from accessing texts about democracy. The decisions by U.S.-based
Internet companies that operate globally have an impact well beyond the 
geographic borders of their home country.
The United States holds a disproportionate amount of economic resources
and wields an extraordinary amount of cultural and military power in the
global context. Therefore U.S. policies exert an enormous amount of influ-
ence over the rest of the world. In protecting white supremacy online the
United States dramatically reduces the likelihood that nations who wish to
regulate it will be able to do so.68 For other democratic nations white su-
premacy online is viewed as an important human-rights issue, based on a col-
lective awareness of historical inequality. Reflecting on past confrontations
with Nazis and other extremists, most Europeans feel that their concerns
about white supremacy online are more than justified.69 In contrast, the pre-
vailing view in the United States is one of intentional disregard and indif-
ference, in which U.S. policymakers are virtually absent from the interna-
tional scene. For example, in 2000 the United States failed to send any
representatives to an international conference on Internet extremism hosted
by the German justice minister.70 This is not the first time that the United
States has stood apart from the international democratic community on is-
sues of human rights.
The United States hesitated for forty years before ratifying and imple-
menting a key international UN human-rights convention. For years the
U.S. Senate rejected human-rights treaties on the grounds that they dimin-
ish basic rights—including the First Amendment right to free speech—
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. Among the other justifications for
not ratifying the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention was an assertion
that the treaty would violate states’ rights, promote world government, en-
hance communist influence, subject citizens to trial abroad, threaten the
United States’ form of government, and increase international entangle-
ments. In 1988, after decades of work by Senator William Proxmire, the
United States finally ratified and enacted into national law the Genocide
Convention Implementation Act. At that point it became illegal under U.S.
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law for any group or individual to “directly and publicly incite another” to vi-
olate the 1948 Genocide Convention, including inciting racial or ethnic ha-
tred. To date, this is the only international human-rights norm with media
consequences to be incorporated into U.S. law.71 And it seems reasonable to
suggest that this international law be leveraged to effectively fight white su-
premacy online transnationally. The biggest barrier to this is the United
States, for not only is it indifferent to addressing this issue within the global
democratic community, but it also simultaneously undermines such efforts
abroad by operating as a safe haven for white supremacy online and serving
as the primary creator of this content available globally.
The resistance to restricting white supremacy online betrays an ignorance
about both the history and contemporary reality of racial inequality in the
United States. Often the embrace of restrictions for white supremacy online
in other countries is contextualized by reference to specific histories of op-
pression, from which the United States is presumably free. For example, in
Goldsmith and Wu’s Who Controls the Internet?, the authors briefly offer an
explanation for why some countries ban hate speech online. They write,
“Germany bans Nazi speech for yet a different reason, the same reason that
Japan’s Constitution outlaws aggressive war: it is a nation still coming to grips
with the horrors it committed in its past, and it is terrified that they could
happen again.”72
Here Goldsmith and Wu locate aggression, war, and “horrors” within other
countries and within a distant past, far removed in time, distance, and polit-
ical reality from the contemporary American context. The authors here also
read a kind of neurosis into these national responses, saying Germany and
Japan are terrified that this could happen again, not, say, that they are “tak-
ing reasonable precautions” or “learning the lessons of history.” Thus, while
the history of fascism and totalitarianism is seen as relevant for understand-
ing restrictions on white supremacy online in Germany and Japan, there is a
tendency in the United States to ignore or downplay the formative effects of
colonialism, slavery, ongoing and systemic racism, and the white racial frame
on the acceptance of white supremacy online.
Free Speech, Freedom from Hate: 
Cyberlibertarians vs. Critical Race Theory
Cyberlibertarians like John Perry Barlow view Internet regulation as anti-
thetical to principles of freedom in cyberspace and in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The cyberlibertarian view holds that “a select number of essential
freedoms—including freedom of speech—are understood to be absolute
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and not negotiable or subject to being balanced.”73 For cyberlibertarians,
white supremacy online is a trivial concern compared to the regulation of
white supremacy online, which is viewed as a more serious threat. For
those who adopt this view, the stories of the Norwegian man arrested for
authoring a white supremacist website or the raid on Germans who used
eBay to trade in Nazi memorabilia are cautionary tales about what hap-
pens when free speech gets trampled. Indeed, they view the regulation of
the Internet as perhaps the most important threat to the civil rights in the
digital age, to the exclusion of all other threats.
Mike Godwin,74 author of Cyber Rights: Defending Free Speech in the Digi-
tal Age,75 argues convincingly for the need to protect freedom of expression
as a fundamental right for ensuring individual liberty in a democracy. In a
chapter of his book called “When Words Hurt: Two Hard Cases about On-
line Speech,” Godwin takes on the critique of feminist legal scholar Cather-
ine MacKinnon, who argues that words have power to harm.76 Her argument,
consistent with that made by critical race theorists, claims that beyond in-
stances in which words incite people to act in violent ways, some words enact
domination and oppression. Godwin takes this claim and uses it to shore up
his assessment that free speech is to be valued above all other rights:
The reason freedom of speech matters is that words do have power—they can
inspire both pleasant and unpleasant thoughts and feelings in the minds of
others. If speech and expression didn’t matter—if they weren’t able to have
such a strong effect on us much of the time—far fewer of us would feel the im-
pulse to ban or restrict what other people say. But neither would so many of us
defend free speech as vehemently as we do.77
Here Godwin acknowledges the power of words and reaffirms the need to
protect free speech. Yet Godwin frames his analysis in this chapter in such a
way as to trivialize78 the power of words and the critique of that power offered
by MacKinnon.79 Godwin’s assessment of the importance of free speech rests
on an analysis of the Internet, and the exchange of information it facilitates
as existing apart from political and social context. Such an analysis does not
take race into consideration and offers no mechanism for evaluating claims
for racial or social justice against the protection of free speech.
Godwin’s cyberlibertarian frame of free speech as separate from a social
and political context systematically disadvantages some members of society
while it privileges others. For example, the lived experience of Bonnie
Jouhari and her daughter illustrates the way this interpretation of free speech
online can have real consequences for people’s lives. The ethos that “infor-
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mation wants to be free” means that Bonnie Jouhari and her daughter are less
free. Framing white supremacy online exclusively as a free-speech issue si-
multaneously enables the formation of a translocal white identity through
the Internet and shifts focus away from any analysis of the human rights of
those targeted by violent white supremacy online, people who are members
of already marginalized groups. Arguments in favor of an absolutist interpre-
tation of the First Amendment are the product of historically, socially, and
culturally situated knowledge.
Many of the first-developed technological advances that gave rise to the
Internet were created in Northern California, much of it in and around Palo
Alto Research Center (PARC).80 Following those technological innovations
were a remarkable series of innovations in business that gave rise to a new in-
dustrial sector centered in San Jose, California, just south of San Francisco,
in an area dubbed Silicon Valley. The inequalities of race, class, and gender of
the broader social context were reinscribed within this newly developed in-
dustrial sector.81 Given this confluence of cybertechnology and Internet in-
dustry in one geographic region, it is not surprising that a particular set of so-
cial and cultural commentators emerged alongside these milieux and shaped
our view of cyberculture. Cyberlibertarians Barlow and Godwin are part of
this cultural milieu, and their view of free speech is a product of this setting.
Critics outside the United States, such as Richard Barbrook, have argued
that beyond the “techno-mysticism” (for example, in Barlow’s Manifesto) is a
legitimating ideology for a nineteenth-century form of nasty, brutish capital-
ism. Barbrook argues that those who share this perspective envision the In-
ternet as a sort of unregulated marketplace usually found only in economics
textbooks. Barbrook (with Cameron) writes, “Instead of supporting a caring
society, they hope that technological progress into the twenty-first century
will inevitably lead back to nineteenth-century ‘tooth-and-claw’ capital-
ism.”82 While Barbrook’s critique errs in its hyperbole, the cyberlibertarian
view of free speech does support an analogous cyberlibertarian model of busi-
ness that is peculiar to a specific geographic, temporal, social, and cultural
context. The cyberlibertarian view of the Internet is one rooted in a partic-
ular American geography imbued with a frontier ethos, tied to both a free-
market analysis of the Internet and a very recent (mis)reading of the First
Amendment as an absolute protection of all speech. Barlow’s pithy aphorism
that in cyberspace the First Amendment is a “local ordinance” takes on new
meaning when we consider the specific context of the emergence of an ab-
solutist defense of free speech online. Of course, this is not a view of the First
Amendment that is universally shared, even within the United States.
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Critical race theorists take a different approach to the First Amendment.
Writing from a critical-race perspective in the introduction to their volume
Words that Wound, legal scholars Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III,
Richard Delgado, and Kimberle Crenshaw address those who defend an ab-
solutist view of the free speech in the following:
Words like intolerant, silencing, McCarthyism, censors, and orthodoxy are used to
portray women and people of color as oppressors and to pretend that the pow-
erful have become powerless. . . . Stripped of its context, this is a seductive ar-
gument. The privilege and power of white male elites is wrapped in the rheto-
ric of politically unpopular speech.83
At the same time that critical race theorists argue that we should enter-
tain the absolutist free-speech arguments, they also contend that we should
place the stories of the victims, those on the receiving end of hate speech, at
the center of our analysis. Indeed, when we reframe white supremacy online
such that at the center of our analysis is the damage to the dignity of human
beings, the issue looks quite different than when framed exclusively as an is-
sue of free speech. This may be a more challenging task within the Informa-
tion Age in which there is a plethora of multivocal stories to be heard; it is
not impossible.
Critical race theory faces other, very real, challenges in the digital era.
One particularly strenuous critique of the speech act perspective (the notion
that speech constitutes action and a central feature of critical race theory) is
Judith Butler’s critique.84 Butler incorporates MacKinnon’s argument about
speech enacting gender oppression with the critical race theorists’ argument
that words wound in the realm of racial oppression. Butler argues that when
race and gender scholars emphasize the damage that words can do, they of-
ten fail to fully take into account the state’s ability to powerfully enact words
in a way that has the potential to harm real people in life-altering ways. In
an analysis of white supremacy, such as the one at hand, it seems that the
racist state, as David Theo Goldberg argues, is a powerful force for maintain-
ing racial inequality.85 Given that the racist state implements systemic
racism, most notably through the criminal-justice system, the notion that the
state might be an effective arbiter of white supremacy online seems deeply
flawed. This is a different argument than the content-free version offered by
cyberlibertarians. Furthermore, while critical race theory offers a powerful
critique of racist hate speech, it inadequately addresses the more sophisti-
cated forms of white supremacy online, such as cloaked sites and the vast
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number of posts at Stormfront, many of which do not meet the legal standard
of hate speech.
Conclusion
The move from print to digital media marks a new, global and Internet-
worked era of white supremacy online that requires global responses. Free-
dom of speech and the protection of equality are both fundamental to the
preservation of human dignity. Within a global context, there is near-
universal agreement among democratic nations that these human rights
should be weighed against one another. The United States stands in stark re-
lief against this global community, functioning as a haven and importer-
exporter for white supremacy online. Yet even the type of antiracism legisla-
tion adopted in the rest of the world would be inadequate to address the kind
of cloaked sites developed by white supremacists in the United States. In or-
der to engage in a meaningful fight against white supremacy online and of-
fline in a global context, we need a new strategy. In the Information Age old-
and new-media white supremacy converge to undermine civil rights, mean-
ing that we need better and more ways to think critically about the Internet,
race, and multiple, intersecting forms of oppression. And it is to that need for
an alternative that I turn in the next, last, chapter.
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